

PARTICIPANTS IN PEACE-KEEPING FORCES *

by

Johan Galtung
Chair in Conflict and Peace Research
University of Oslo

and

Helge Hveem
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

1. Peace-Keeping: Distance or Closeness.

This report is based on a questionnaire investigation of Norwegian participants in peace-keeping forces in Gaza (UNEF) and in ^{the} Congo (ONUC). The data were gathered by the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo in 1967, based on the work of a research group that had prepared the questionnaire.¹ In the research group former participants in these peace-keeping forces also took part, and the questionnaire was administered to a sample of the about 13.000 Norwegians who at that time had served in the UN forces. They were (including NCOs) divided into four groups: privates and officers in the Gaza and the Congo operations, and the total number of respondents was 1.319.² The sample was stratified, and being a mail questionnaire one should not claim that the answers are entirely representative, but on the other hand the tendencies are often very clear and found in most of the four groups so we would be inclined to rely on them, particularly where they are consistent.

The general theoretical problem to be explored can be formulated very simply: what was the role of the UN soldier, as seen by some of these soldiers themselves? More particularly, where was it located on a scale ranging from the most minimum role definition to a maximum role conception? Or formulated differently, where was it located on an axis from distance from the social reality in which they were embedded to close-ness and involvement?

It may immediately be objected that this is a pseudo

question for the definition of the UN soldier as it comes out of instructions given to them from the UN or from national commands, not to mention from local commanders is relatively clear: it is a minimum role with a certain amount of distance from the scene. The task is that of keeping peace, not of making it or building it. More concretely, the task is that of a fire brigade, to be on duty, on constant call, close enough to be able to act quickly, yet an observer rather than a participant. As for the fire brigade the task includes observation of any kind of small incident, "brush-fire" that might escalate into the big event. Unlike the fire brigade, however, there was the implicit, possibly rather demoralizing assumption that the bigger the final event the less likely the participation of UN peace-keeping forces - as was finally brought out clearly during the days of June 1967. On the other hand, like the fire brigade, the UN peace-keeping forces (UNPKF) do not really act at the micro level, like the fire brigade participant they are not stationed inside private homes, peering into local fireplaces or the hearts and minds of men and women everywhere in order to see whether something might be brewing.

So, as a conclusion, there is no doubt that the role is defined in a relatively minimal sense and at a social, if not geographical distance from the scene. The concept is that of a soldier, an expert in violence both in the sense of deterring it and in the sense of using it skillfully, minimally, so as to prevent more extensive use of violence. Since ultimately violence may have to be used, if not on a large scale, social distance may be desirable in order to keep peace - for the same reason as the police forces in many countries are never stationed in the cities or the villages from which they come, always somewhere else where they can exercise their sometimes unpleasant duties unimpeded by excessive closeness.

But there is also the other role conception better expressed in such terms as "peace-making" and "peace-building".³ In this case the task is not merely to keep the potential belligerent apart, but rather to weld them together in a functional, equitable,

accepted social framework. These are also third party roles, an outsider is offering his good services, for instance as a mediator or as social planner with a particular view to solving conflict through cooperation between the parties. In that case very detailed knowledge of the local situation is needed, but also more than that: one practically speaking has to be a part of the local situation to the point where one is no longer a third party but a new party, for instance by filling new roles that did not formerly exist, in close interaction in everyday life with all parties to the conflict. This is what usually happens when the central government of a country builds institutions in the periphery torn by, for instance, ethnic strife, interacting with both sides, thereby constituting an organic link between them.

Again it may be objected that this may be so, but that was not the task of the UN peace-keeping forces. This is true, but it may also be that it should have been the task, that in fact one is dealing with a misconception because of the endeavor to separate the peace-keeping function from peace-making and peace-building functions. After all police officers everywhere are parts of the local community and although their role behavior as police may be rather circumscribed they enter in a multiplicity of settings that makes it possible also to exercise other roles, for instance in voluntary associations, in community work etc. Thus, they are able to transcend the specificity of their roles narrowly defined and enter into widespread, perhaps also more diffusely defined relations that may facilitate their work profoundly, although it may also lead to, for instance, corruption. ⁴

Without arguing what the function of the UN in such conflicts could be or should be in the future, however, there is a more immediate problem that can be explored by means of such questionnaires: how do the participants themselves see the situation? Where are they located on the spectrum mentioned above, what kind of problems are there, where does the role conception look relatively clear, where is it rather diffuse ?

With that relatively broad problem definition we now turn to the data.

2. Motivation and Local Setting.

One of the first striking features when one looks at the responses is that the participants did not have much experience abroad in any sense before they came to such rather exotic sounding places as Gaza and ^{the}Congo. Of course, the officers had considerable travel experience, but more than half of the privates had never been outside Scandinavia, 51% of the privates to Gaza never outside Norway. Since Norwegians generally travel rather much, not the least due to being a sea-faring nation, the implication would be that the participants in general did not have a reservoir of experience to draw upon, a comparative basis - and also that the travel aspect, the tourist side of the exercise must have loomed rather high on the horizon. Any loneliness or anxiety that this may have led to was compensated for by the circumstance that many of them entered UN service with somebody they knew already (2/3 of the officers, for instance); but 42% of the privates in Gaza and 63% of those in ^{the}Congo did not come together with friends. They brought with them, however, an image of their own environment - people at the place they lived, their own family, most of their friends, Norwegians in general as being very positive to the mission - the percentage perceiving the environment back in Norway as hostile was consistently low.

But why, then, did they go into the UN service? They were asked to tick off as many as they wanted of 11 reasons, both those reasons that were important for themselves and those that they felt were important for most of the other people who went into the service. And there is no doubt about the result: consistently the highest percentage was "to get to see far-away places", and the second in line was "because the salary was good" (only among the officers in ^{the}Congo there were more people, 78%, who marked this reason than the first one, which was chosen by 64%). Then, the privates - particularly in Gaza - saw this as a "fine way to do regular military duty" -

simply doing time, whereas the officers both places saw it as a way in which they could "gain military experience". And then come such reasons as "to support Norwegian efforts in the world today", "to get to a place where something is happening", "to contribute to strengthening the UN".

Thus, the conclusion is that the motivation pattern is not related to the conflict, or to the task in general. One gets the impression from the data that any other job, equally paid and located at the same place would be equally attractive.

The motivation pattern is self-oriented and related to one's own setting back home, not other-oriented, related to the place where one is working. This is certainly a rather general syndrome and might also apply to, for instance, technical assistance experts. It is not so much what they can contribute abroad as what being abroad can contribute to them at home that matters - perhaps. We mention this because that type of orientation is highly compatible with a minimum role definition and social distance in general - the basic point is not to get involved, in a sense not to put one's soul into it but leave it behind, letting the body perform its duties.

It should be mentioned, though, that they do mark a number of motives: most of them mention two or three. But when pressed to give only one exactly the same pattern came out: "to get to see far-away places" was preferred, followed by "because the salary was good" - the latter being the more important for the Congo officers. But this, then, shows up in an interesting way in their wishes, retrospectively, for the kind of information they think participants to UN forces should have before they start their service. It is not "information about geography and climate" that ranks highest, nor "information about the cultural and historical background of the place" - possibly because this was what they had already acquired as a background basis for their tour. What they by far wanted most were "information about the role of the UN in the conflict" (around 90% emphasized that this was needed - which must serve as an indication that very little had in fact been given relative to the needs), then "information about the background of the conflict" (about 75% - again strange that it

should be so necessary to emphasize this point) and finally, around 2/3 mentioned the need for "information about local customs at the place of service". In other words, already at this point a certain inconsistency shows up: their motivation pattern was not very different from that of the tourist, yet the need for much more information that could give content to their service seems to have been prevalent. Of course, it is a far distance from these three items to real closeness, to a more maximally defined role, but it is also a far distance from the very minimum where one performs a certain guard ritual and sees the entire experience as precisely that, something enriching - in both senses of that word - for oneself.

Whatever they got of information they say they obtained it through "briefings by superiors before service" and most of the information about the conflict itself was obtained through "talks with others in the UN force". Many also mention "reading books and newspapers before-hand", "Norwegian newspapers or radio," but consistently low is such a source of information as "official information from the UN" and "local information". Again the impression is the same: an impression of living in a plastic bubble, an individual bubble where motivation is concerned and a Norwegian one where information is concerned - with little contact with local population and with the UN as such.

What, then, was the relation to the local population? They certainly report "almost every day" to have had contact with people from the local population, and "while on duty". The two most frequently mentioned categories were merchants and farmers for the Gaza contingent, "hunters, tribal people" combined with local police and military for the Congo participants. In addition to that the officers (70% in Gaza and 75% in Congo) mention "own native servant". But this does not mean much in terms of contact: the overwhelming majority of the respondents spent time with people from the local population off duty only "now and then" or "never" - and in that case with the categories mentioned, including "civilian Europeans" in the case of the Congo group. And there is no doubt that the contact was at a

distance: only very few say that they went to the homes of people from the non-European part of the population quite often or often - the typical response being "rarely" or "never" - in spite of the relatively long tour of duty. The same applies to "talking to the local people to find out their opinion of the conflict" - although around 15% of the privates and 20% of the officers report that this happened "often" or "quite often". But they did not present their own views, in conformity with a third party type of role, and even if they made friends among the local people the friendship could not possibly be very deep since almost none of them even report that it resulted in sending postcards and letters after return home. In other words: there was some opening in the "plastic bubble" to let in the merchant and the servant-since they perform roles of key significance in connection with what "abroad can do for me" - and not much beyond that. The number of real friendships with the local population, and lasting beyond tour of duty was minimal.

How, then, did they think that the local population reacted to the UN forces, when they arrived, and after seeing them at work? The perception these participants have is overwhelmingly positive: very few locals dislike the UNPKF, most of them accepted it and liked it well. Of course, this may reflect the contact surface in the local population: that merchants and servants liked this new opportunity would go without saying, farmers might also have considerable stake in it. Since there was little or no contact at all with local political forces real attitudes of some significance for the conflict itself might have remained relatively unknown, except to the more prying and observant among the officers and some of the privates. At any rate, the image reported is not one of dynamism: attitudes are and were about the same, which is probably more or less correct for if there had been very important changes the participants would in a more or less stereotyped way have reflected this.

There is an ecology to this type of isolation: the Gaza people lived in barracks in a camp and in tents, the Congo

participants in villas (71% of the officers) and in barracks (46% of the privates). Thus, inside the forces there were evidently low class and high class ghettos, neither of them conducive to much contact with the average man in the local setting. There might have been a difference, though, between those who lived in villas in white-dominated areas (Leopoldville, Elisabethville) and those who lived in the smaller and mostly African-populated towns (Goma, Albertville etc.) - The latter interacting more with African population than the former.

The dominant pattern of little contact with the local setting is then reinforced by the pattern of togetherness with other UNPKF contingents, from other nations. The Norwegian participants reported that they had very "much in common" with them, and although most of them only shared quarters with Norwegians, particularly the officers in Gaza (50% of them) lived closely together with other Scandinavians. It was also extended to other UN forces participants, but in that case particularly to participants from English-speaking countries. And this ties in with what we know about their linguistic ability: only about 1/4 of the privates in the Congo and 1/3 of those in Gaza report not to be able to speak and read English adequately. Consequently, they also made friends among UN people from other nations, more so in the Congo than in Gaza, and here the percentage "sending post-cards now and then" is considerably higher than for the local population - as one would expect. Also, between 1/3 and 2/3 of the four categories report that they "very much" would like to meet some of them again. In short: the UN contingents provided them with a milieu more than the local population.

If we now stick to the plastic bubble image, how was life inside the plastic bubble? Not bad, according to the answers. Only very few felt that they "very often" or "quite often" were missing the possibility of more leisure time activities (10-15%); except for the privates in the Congo only very few felt that the supply of PX-stores at the place where they were stationed was "bad"; more than 75% in all categories felt that they "never" had any difficulty with the climate and about the same numbers were "never" ill during their stay. They spent their time, so it seems, doing photography and writing letters, reading papers and books, with sports, and talking to friends (the least chosen category "going to parties" is perhaps the category that outsiders thought was filling their leisure time most effectively!)

And most importantly, little or no difficulty on the job: almost all of them report that the group they worked with daily went well together. The only place where there is some skepticism is in the report of the Norwegian UN personnel's view of the local population: here there is even some dynamism. Whereas they felt that the local population had kept their views of the UN contingent constant during their stay, that was not what they reported about the Norwegians: the percentage that did not like the local population much, or right out disliked them, changed from 28% to 53% for the privates in Gaza, from 20-51% for the officers in Gaza, from 10% - 20% for the privates in the Congo and from 9% - 26% for the officers in the Congo.

This leaves open the usual problem: was there friction because there was isolation, or was there isolation because of anticipated friction? And equally as usual: the answer probably lies in the dialectic between the two. The important thing for our purpose, however, is that it is insufficient to describe the total situation in terms of lack of contact - there is also a dimension of negative contact if we assume that the perceptions are relatively accurate. And this is of course related to what they see as their job: when asked what they considered more important, that a UN force should "try to get well linked by the population in the area; or that it commands respect even if this means that it might be necessary to be a little hard-handed" the majority in all places except - significantly - the privates in the Congo, chose the latter. Distance and respect; not closeness, familiarity, dialogue on equal terms - in short, a setting very close to the idea of a minimum role, but, with a yearning for more knowledge instrumental to the type of task they have.

3. Views on the Conflicts.

These Norwegian soldiers were inserted into two important conflicts: the Middle East conflict between Arabs and Israelis and the conflict in ^{the} Congo which looked like a conflict between the central government and a secessionist group headed by Tshombe in Katanga but which was, deeper seen, a conflict between a new nation-state and international capitalism, the former backed by the United Nations, the latter expressed by Union Minière ^{du Haute Katanga.} / The second conflict was rather remote for the Norwegians, the former well known in a Norwegian political climate that in the 1960's was definitely on the Israeli side.

How, then, did they react? The following tables give us some impressions:

Table 1. Who was most to blame for the conflict? (%)

	G A Z A		C O N G O	
<u>before departing from Norway</u>	privates	officers	privates	officers
both equally	39	25	26	26
one more to blame	44	53	26	28
third parties	14	20	39	39
<u>after returning to Norway</u>				
both equally	19	21	15	16
one more to blame	55	50	19	20
third parties	24	28	60	60
<u>% difference, after-before</u>				
both equally	-20	-4	-11	-10
one more to blame	+11	-3	-7	-8
third parties	+10	+8	+21	+21

Table 2. How was your own attitude? (%)

<u>before departing from Norway</u>	G A Z A		C O N G O	
	privates	officers	privates	officers
neutral	46	47	52	51
mostly for Israel, Katanga	43	48	11	8
mostly for the Arabs, central government	2	1	24	36
<u>after returning to Norway</u>				
neutral	16	26	33	30
mostly for Israel/ Katanga	75	63	21	28
mostly for the Arabs/ central government	3	7	11	4
<u>% difference, after-before</u>				
neutral	-30	-21	-19	-21
mostly for Israel/ Katanga	+32	+15	+10	+20
mostly for the Arabs/ central government	+1	+6	-15	-32

The conclusions to be drawn are relatively unambiguous: as time passed on, as they did their service, three changes took place:

- (1) Neutral, balanced views became increasingly impossible, there was a tendency to take sides;
- (2) In the two conflicts there was an increasing sympathy for Israel for the Gaza participants and for Katanga for the Congo participants;
- (3) There was, however, also a very pronounced tendency to put the blame on third parties, more particularly on "politicians in other countries" in the case of the Middle East conflict, and on "businessmen and industrialists in other countries" in the case of the Congo conflict.

These findings are interesting. First of all they show what is certainly not unexpected: the closer one comes to a conflict scene, the more difficult it is to maintain any kind of "balanced attitude". Second, positive attitudes develop

in favor of Israel and Katanga - and for this many reasons may be adduced a tendency to favor David in any David-Goliath confrontation; it is easier for Norwegians to identify with Israelis than with Arabs, and with the Katanga secessionists than with the central government - if for no other reason simply because of the level of technical-economic development; these two had the best public relations image in the type of mass media to which Norwegians had access; in general, they were more "pro-West" which Norwegians at that time would also tend to be; Norwegians stationed in an Arab and general Congo environment had negative experiences, frictions of various kinds that may also have influenced their view.

However that may be, we are more interested in the first point: it is difficult to maintain a neutral attitude. That is: one may see the third finding, the tendency to find a "third party" and put the blame on that one, as a way of sharing the blame equally in the sense that both parties as commonly defined are acquitted. To the extent that this is the case the underlying conflict perception may of course be said to be naive: these are not really "third parties" but parties to a coalition some of which is located in the conflict theater, some of which is outside. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that a deeper view of the conflict developed, more aspects became visible, more differentiated views emerged.

This is important because it brings us to the basic dilemma we tried to elucidate: distance or closeness? Even though the setting is an institutionalization of distance being that close nevertheless forces the UNPKF participants to take sides. Since their role behavior is supposed to be strictly impartial this means that a contradiction is emerging between attitude and behavior. This may not be so important as seen from the outside because the behavior is rigidly controlled in a military structure - and for that reason the military, hierarchical structure may be the only one that can be used for this kind of purpose. But seen from the inside, from the point of view of the participants themselves we would expect a certain amount of tension and frustration to crystal-

lize as time passes on. For there is no doubt that they have taken sides. This comes out even more clearly when they are asked where they could imagine to settle if they should stay in the area for a shorter or longer period: the Gaza participants overwhelmingly choose Israel (80%: 3% for the privates, 62%-8% for the officers) and something of the same for the Congo participants (58%-16% for the privates, 56%-15% for the officers).

We can get some more insight into this by studying the perceptions the participants had of the groups and the people parties to the conflict. They were presented with a list of adjectives: friendly, active, strong-willed, democratic, honest, courageous, wise, quick and were asked to indicate what they thought would be fitting descriptions of, for instance, "Israelis", "Arabs" and "Palestinian refugees". It should be noted that all the adjectives were positively formulated because, for obvious reasons, we did not want direct formulations of negative stereotypes from people who had participated in such important missions, on a world scale as UN peace-keeping forces. Nevertheless, the results are interesting:

(1) There was no difficulty distributing these positive attributes on Israelis, but of the Gaza participants about 50% were of the opinion that the adjectives did not fit - meaning that they were too positive - for Arabs. Predominant characteristics attributed to the Israelis are "strong-willed" and "courageous"; the Arabs and the Palestinians are seen as "friendly" which combined with the unwillingness to attribute the other adjectives to them reads something like "smiling natives". It is also interesting to note that whereas the mode of number of adjectives chosen was 3 for the Israelis, it was 0 for Arabs and Palestinians - strong versus weak images indeed!

What happens when . . . instead of looking at the nations we look at the top personalities, at . . . Ben Gurion (the former Israeli Premier at that time) and Nasser (the then President of Egypt)? Of course, there is more of an image

of Nasser than there is of Arabs, and less of an image of Ben Gurion than there is of Israelis. But Ben Gurion comes out as strong-willed, courageous, wise and active; Nasser comes out as active and strong-willed - but there is also the clear feeling that the adjectives on the list simply do not fit.

For the Congo theater the same test was used concerning the "Congolese", the "Katangese"⁵, and the "Europeans in Katanga". The finding is relatively clear: there is not so much difference between the Congolese and the Katangese: the most frequently chosen category is "friendly", with the idea that no adjective fits as a good number 2. The image is bland as for the Arabs and the Palestinians, but for the Europeans in Katanga it is more clear and relatively similar to the image of the Israelis: they are strong-willed, active, courageous - and friendly! And this, of course, gives us one cue why there was increased sympathy for Katanga: maybe not so much because of the Africans in Katanga as because of the Europeans with which ~~there~~ must have been a high level of identification. There is actually an indirect confirmation of this idea: the images of Lumumba and of Tshombe are relatively similar, they are both active and strong-willed and courageous - although there is the difference that Tshombe is seen as "wise" in addition. But the difference in profile is not nearly as pronounced as the difference between the images of Ben Gurion and Nasser.

It is tempting to suggest that there is an element of "racist" identification here: firstly, the Europeans in the Congo represented a pole of attraction that did not exist in Gaza; there the Israelis got the identification of the troops which might be referred to "racism". Secondly, there was no difference of opinion on Lumumba and Tshombe, both Blacks, whereas "Katanga" got much more positive identification than "Congo" (the Central Government).⁶

It is quite interesting to compare all this with the images of Hammarskjöld and U Thant - the former and present Secretary General at the time when the survey was made. All these positive adjectives are generously distributed by all four groups on both of them, with very small differences except for the tendency to see Hammarskjöld as more courageous than U Thant was perceived. Incidentally, neither of them is seen as being "quick" - probably a reaction and a reflection on UN bureaucracy rather than on these two persons themselves. We mention this because it illustrates, in a certain sense, the UN "plastic bubble": well developed, positive and differentiated and rich images inside the bubble, much more bland and stereotyped images outside.

But then, on the other hand, these Norwegians experienced the conflict at a distance. The UN was probably a closer reality to most of them being the source of livelihood and the framework within which they were working. Thus, only about 20% of them were ever involved in an exchange of fire, only few of them reported that they were often or quite often in a situation where there was a great danger of an exchange of fire, very few of them (from 2% to 6%) were taken prisoners for some time, and very few of them were afraid of being hurt. In short, the distance built into the setting was also built into the actual service as a soldier: it was the potential, rather than the actual use of violence that dominated the situation for the Norwegian contingent. It might have been interesting to see what would have happened to the attitudes if they had been more exposed to "shot fired in anger". Needless to say, it would depend rather much on who fired those shots, and how well they aimed - but again, a strengthening or weakening of the tendency to favor one rather than the other party might not affect their behavior as UN soldiers.

This shows up directly when they were asked a question designed to tap exactly this: "Did you ever think it would have been more satisfactory to you yourself if you had been able to support one of the parties more actively?" Of course, the majority say no, around 60% say never. But the remainder say "now and then", "quite often", and "often". And although

this does not apply quite as often to the officers as to the privates, that difference is a minor one in this particular case.

About the same profile appears when they are asked whether they think the UN should have taken a different stand on the conflict: although the majority feel that "the UN stand was the only one practical" there are those who think the UN should have been more neutral and -(a smaller group) - those who feel that the UN should have given more support to one of the sides.

But these critical voices are scant and dispersed. By and large they feel that the UN force "was of great use in the area", they are in doubt when it comes to whether there is a continued need for UN forces there, but they are "quite satisfied" with their own effort in the UN service and with the group they belong to - and only very few feel that they would not consider enlisting again if Norway were asked to take part in other UN operations. In short, they come out as favorable to the UN, not overwhelmingly so, but with sufficient margin to make it clear that by and large they would constitute a source of positive propaganda for this type of UN activity.

4. The Role of a UN Soldier.

Having presented the general dilemma between distance and closeness let us then have a look at how these participants defined the role. What do they think a UN soldier should do and what should he not do? They were given 20 descriptions of actions, and asked to indicate whether these were things that they "absolutely must do", "preferably should do", "may or may not do", "preferably should not do", "absolutely must not do".

Only four of the 20 items came out with a very clear profile, meaning that more than 90% in all four categories felt that these were things one should or must (not) do. The items were: "study thoroughly what the conflict is about", "emphasize that he is in UN service, not national", "study the general conditions of the country where he is serving" and "be able to speak and understand at least one world language". These are rather obvious things, one would be rather surprised if anybody had been against this or even felt that one "may or may not". It goes without saying that the officers are even more determined in this regard than the privates.

But when it comes to many other issues there is not much consensus in the role image, there even seems to be some confusion. This is particularly clear in the relationship to the local population - and this is also precisely where the dilemma distance versus closeness is located.

Thus, the participants are very much split on the issue of whether they should try to get in contact with the local people when off duty: close to 50% are of the opinion that one may or may not, and the rest are equally divided in the must/should people and the must not/should not people. They agree, however, that they should not make their opinion of the conflict clear to the local population. Again, it is particularly the officers who feel strongly that one should not make one's opinion clear to the local population - in general we find that whenever there is a tendency in the data

about role images the officers express this tendency even more strongly, as is to be expected.⁷

What about the classical question encountered by all kinds of "international men", such as technical assistance experts: should one "maintain a high standard of living to make one's self respected" - or "live as frugally as possible in order not to offend the local people"? There is a clear tendency in favor of frugality: relatively few (between 10-20%) say explicitly that one should not live frugally, this figure increases somewhat when it is formulated positively in terms of having a standard of living that inspires respect. The conclusion is "may or may not" - since this must have been a hotly debated issue most of the time it is quite clear that there is considerable confusion at this point. Incidentally, it is particularly the officers who feel that one should not maintain a high standard of living, but the differences are not very pronounced.

Nor is there a clear situation when it comes to the old problem of whether one should give money to begging children or not: between 50-60% say "may or may not"; but the overwhelming majority of the remainder are of the opinion that one should/must not. This may not differ significantly from the local population's attitude or a tourist attitude - but it still indicates a field where no clear prescription has emerged for the UN soldier. Where there is a high level of consensus, however, is that in such situations one has to be more militarily correct than at home: it is quite clear that the majority, about 80%, were of the opinion that the norms at home were not sufficient for the level of correctness needed such places. This attitude was particularly pronounced among the officers.

What about role relations relative to the UN - was there any sign that this had crystallized further?

We have mentioned already that they overwhelmingly agreed that they should emphasize that they were in UN service, whether this is because they thought any positive behavior should be

credited to the UN or that any negative behavior on their part should not be blamed on Norway. And they also feel that one should study the most important aspects of whatever else the UN is doing, but "preferably" rather than "absolutely", just as one "preferably" and not "absolutely" should try to get well acquainted with people from other countries' contingents.

One indicator here of how uncrystallized the status is lies in how they feel they should react when the UN commits mistakes - should they admit this frankly to the local people, to other UN personnel? The answers are well distributed on the five possible categories, only that relatively few say that one "absolutely must" admit it to the local people, and relatively few say that one "absolutely must not" admit it to other UN participants. And the same applies to the easy way out: although relatively few answer "absolutely must" there is a relatively equal split on the remaining possibilities when it comes to whether one should emphasize one's own nationality and that one is not responsible for everything the UN does. How should one interpret this?

On the one hand it is a sign of lack of crystallization of the role, on the other hand it is also a sign of a certain detachment. If they had felt thoroughly integrated relative to the UN rather than to the local population the differences reported in Table 3 between how they view the role relative to UN personnel and relative to the local people would have been much higher:

Table 3. Should one admit UN mistakes? (% difference)

	To UN personnel - to the local people			
	G A Z A		C O N G O	
	parti- cipants	officers	parti- cipants	officers
absolutely must	+6	+8	+8	+7
preferably should	+12	+11	+5	+11
may or may not	+29	+22	+20	+23
preferably should not	-25	-16	-17	-23
absolutely must not	-21	-24	-14	-17

As it stands there is no doubt that they would rather admit (and discuss) mistakes inside the system, but the differences are not that overwhelming when one considers that it could have been a consistent row of plus 100 for "absolutely must" and an equally consistent row of minus 100 for "absolutely must not". Hence, there are two conclusions to be drawn: there is not much of an integration into the UN peace-keeping system, and, on the other hand, they are not that detached from the local population either - they are probably somehow suspended in between the two, not having really good contact with either.

When one then asks more in detail how they are related to the contingents from the other nations the general predilections for work with other Scandinavians and people from English speaking countries comes out quite clearly. Only very few would like to see the Norwegian contingent mixed with people from other nations, and they are particularly loathe to see them closely together with southern Europeans, Latin Americans, Africans and Asians. This is clearly expressed when the question is asked in the form "If there should be fighting, with the soldiers from which countries would you rather fight together?" where the only non north European/Anglo Saxon element would be a Congo-participant predilection for Asians, probably meaning ^(Indian) gurkha/soldiers. Significantly, this category scores highest when the question reads "From a military point of view, which countries have the best soldiers?". But when the formulation is in terms of who are best suited for their work in the UN forces, or who were most liked by the civilian population in the area, who had the best understanding of the causes of the conflict, or from which countries would you prefer the commanding officers to be: always Norwegians, Scandinavians and English-speaking people. The others would only dominate the ranking list when the questions were negative: who "were least neutral to the conflict", "who had least contact with the local population", etc.

The relation to the other UN contingents thus, is problematic: there is a certain distance to everything outside one's own, and then there is positive discrimination in favor of geographical and cultural neighbors, negative discrimination in disfavor of the rest. How is this solved from an organizational point of view?

The respondents were asked how one should constitute a UN force, should it consist entirely of soldiers from one country, or should it be "pure" at the brigade level, consisting of brigades from different nations; at the battalion level consisting of battalions from different nations and so on for companies and troops? Very few wanted a UN force that consisted entirely of soldiers from one country (from 6-9%); but even fewer wanted to mix soldiers from different nations together within one platoon (from 2-6%). The most frequently picked views seemed to be a UN brigade consisting of battalions from different nations, thus making for a compromise between distance and closeness. Needless to say, military hierarchization lends itself to this kind of compromise whether it is to the good or to the bad.

However, there are actually different things they think of when it comes to the important question of how UN forces should be better able to carry out their job. They ask for "better arms and equipment" and not for "better military training" but for "better police training" - this is particularly pronounced for the Gaza participants. In short, the problems are seen in terms of a certain type of expertise police are supposed to have more of than the military, and in terms of hardware. There is also the view "that participants should be better informed about the conflict", "better trained in dealing with people from other countries" - whereas (with the exception of the officers in ^{the} Congo!) not much importance is attributed to "better organization at UN headquarters", or "better local organization of the UN force".

In a sense there is an interesting contradiction here: the police role has less distance built into it, less of a minimum role conception - but increased reliance on hardware would point in the opposite direction. But there is also

a logic to this: the military role in which the soldiers were put must have been perceived as inadequate in low temperature situations where closeness would be called for, e.g. ability to really understand what is going on at the human and social levels - and the rather modest arms with which they were equipped were totally inadequate in a high temperature situation. Rather than being disarmed military forces they seem to opt for being armed police forces - both of them quite understandable in view of the situation in which they were located.

5. Conclusion.

The dilemma of the participants is also our analytical dilemma - and more significantly, it is a political dilemma of the United Nations. On the one hand there is a relatively clear minimum role definition in terms of guard and observation duty, keeping the parties apart with a very modest display of arms, showing behavior rather than attitude. On the other hand there is another type of role: being involved, being a part and party to the entire conflict system, showing attitude as well as behavior, but trying to mediate and trying to help build a new social structure encompassing the antagonists. The former role is possible but not very effective, the second is very effective, but not very possible.

The minimal role has the advantage from a certain point of view that it does not ask for attitudes - all it asks for is a certain type of behavior in certain situations, and in other situations there may very well be some role confusion. The other role also asks for attitudes, and if attitudes are called for we know from the data something about in which direction they would have been. The development that has taken place since the survey was made has by and large been in favor of the Arab cause in general and Palestinians in particular rather than the Israelis, and in favor of the central government rather than the Katanga secessionists - in other words, the inclination found in the Norwegian UNPKF participants has so far not proven to be on the "side of history".⁸

So there we stand, more or less: a choice between distance, neutral behavior and a certain shallowness on the one hand, and closeness, partial behavior and political implausibility on the other. On the one hand are three mutually reinforcing aspects of the situation in which the UNPKF participant finds himself: the motivation pattern in terms of curiosity and good salaries, the general social distance to the Arab and African worlds, and the rather minimum definition of the role with its rights and duties as it emerged in practice. On the other hand there seems to be a yearning for something more than this -

a latent motivation, a desire for more contact and understanding, a need for a broader conceptualization and enactment of the role.

There is a contradiction here, and it cannot be resolved within the framework defined by the present pattern of peace-keeping operations. There is no way, it seems, of combining control and even exercise direct violence, with a closer and broader role relationship. It is only by changing the whole conception of third party roles in conflicts that basically different roles can emerge.

The way to proceed would, obviously, be to build into the role peace-making and peace-building components - as indicated several times above. Thus, in some of the UN operations, and towards the top level, elements of peace-making, particularly in the form of mediation, have been built into the concept, making for much closer patterns of participation and much broader role relationships.⁹ These have been elite roles, however - hardly for the common participant - but then it may also be argued that it is only at the top level that such operations can be effective anyhow. Only at that level will the necessary educational base be sufficient for such delicate operations to work. And - a much stronger argument: if there is broad role-participation on a large scale, with thousands participating like in the UNEF and the ONUC operations, it may amount to some type of internal intervention. Nevertheless, it might be possible under some conditions to combine the peace-keeping function of the UN soldier, the peace-making function of the mediator, e.g. of the Quaker type, and the peace-building function of the peace corps volunteer.¹⁰ That would make for a very rich role combination, somewhat similar to what Gandhi experimented with, on a non-violent basis in his satyagraha brigades - and might even be highly effective. Precisely for that reason it cannot be left entirely to the outside: the broader the role defined for a third party, the more does it turn the local population into clients, taking away from them the experience that might have served them in building conflict resolution capacity, leaving them with solutions rather than challenges.

Thus, beyond the contradiction of the present role, between its limited scope and a natural desire to do something more,

is the more "advanced" contradiction, which may well turn into a conflict, between all those who say "what an interesting conflict you have, let me solve it for you", and those who are parties to that conflict. If solving the first contradiction leads on to the second, then what is the way out of the second contradiction? Possibly some kind of formula whereby local conflict participants and outside third parties would merge into one flexible organization for conflict resolution with social justice, possibly some formula whereby the parties do without third parties at all. In either case it seems to be true that if the conflict can be resolved with such means, then it cannot be very deeply rooted in the social structure. A real structural conflict, built around deep-rooted patterns of exploitation can hardly be resolved by means of third parties - true liberation of the underdog has also to be by the underdog, and usually not through "cooperation" but through some type of withdrawal from the structure (strike, civil disobedience, sabotage), even destruction of the structure in order to create a new structure.

But given the conditions under which an enlarged third party role would be meaningful, do the data indicate that these Norwegians would be adequate for that kind of a job? Superficially seen the data seem to be indicative of the contrary. There are clear signs of very limited contact surface with the local population, of stereotyped attitudes to non-Western groups, of a Western bias in the political evaluation of the situation, of a tendency only to prefer that which is close and similar. But, to our mind, this should not be a source of worry, for at least three good reasons.

First, all these are highly predictable patterns, growing out of the Norwegian setting from which they come, with its particular culture, political perspective and image of the world. Second, there is no reason to believe that any other national group would have been much better or worse: as we live in a world of nation states, at present, polarized by some conflicts, this is what we get. And third and most importantly: when such attitudes develop, it is also a sign of how little was done locally to counteract this, how ineffective the organization in general and briefing in particular must have been, and above all: the role did not call for anything above relatively primitive, stereotyped analysis, reflecting pre-judgements already acquired at home.

The easy, actor-oriented reaction to such findings would be to say that there must be something wrong with these Norwegians, and, we would bet, one would be in for some disappointments as other nations contingents are likely to exhibit the same or similar patterns.¹¹ A less easy, more structure-oriented view would ask for a change of those elements in the structure of a UN peace-keeping operation that would fail to counteract, perhaps even reinforce such attitudes. But beyond the indication given above we are not prepared to develop a more clear image of an alternative structure - perhaps because we feel that the world, by and large, is not yet ready for this approach.

N O T E S

* The present paper is an outcome of a project on international peace-keeping at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and is published as PRIO-publication No.17-10. We would like to express special gratitude to Otto Grieg-Tidemand and the late Arne G. Lund, who as secretary and undersecretary of defense facilitated the collection of data, and to colonel Bjørn Egge and Lt.col. Fredrik Bull-Hansen who contributed much valuable advice in connection with the construction of the questionnaire and the interpretation of the results. Kjell Skjelsbæk also contributed with critique and interpretation. The responsibility for the conclusion drawn, however, are entirely our own.

The project has been financially supported by The Norwegian Council for Research and the Humanities (NAVF) and The Norwegian Council for Arms Control and Disarmament (Nedrustningsutvalget).

1. The intention was actually to supplement the questionnaire study with other research techniques such as in-depth interviewing, but due to the sensitive nature of this subject that was given up. A small pilot project in Gaza, however, was completed - see "Some Factors Affecting Local Acceptance of a UN Force: A Pilot Project Report from Gaza" (Essay, II,9).
2. The response rate was 45,3% .
3. See "Three Approaches to Peace: Peace-keeping, Peace-making and Peace-building" (Essays, II,11), also in Impact of Science on Society, vol. 26, No.1.
For an early evaluation of the peace-keeping approval in the context of Nordic UN forces, see Per Frydenberg, ed. Peace-keeping Experience and Evaluation, The Oslo Papers, Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1964.
4. One of the simplest relations is the relation of marriage and parenthood in the community, giving rise to countless ties with the local population. Needless to say the UN peace-keeping forces had no such ties so their relations remained more abstract, devoid of much human content.
5. The Katangese are, of course, also Congolese - but that distinction made very much sense in the early 1960s. The concept "Katangese" was sponsored by the small African elite supporting Tshombe and the European interests promoting secessionism; it very probably had little meaning to the average African living in the Katanga region, busy with day-to-day life problems, and, in some areas, with inter-tribal strife that cut across the Congo-Katanga distinction.
6. One author, Jens Erik Normann: Hvit slave blant svarte (White Slave among Blacks): En helikopterflygers erfaringer fra Kongo, Oslo, (Gyldendal), 1972, argues on the basis of his own experiences in the Congo that all Norwegians in ONUC were racist

and manifested it whenever they had a chance. While one of the present authors has first-hand information from his own experience as ONUC member in 1963 which gives some support of Norwegian thesis, we find it much too general and not founded on reliable sources to be acceptable.

7. Their commitment is deeper, consequently whatever normative element there is it should be more pronounced among the officers. If it were the other way round, the stage would be set for a conflict between idealistic privates and more or less corrupt officers - the data show convincingly that this was not the case.

8. But in so being they were not the only ones - - -, and hardly different from participants in other contingents from Western countries.

9. This is very clearly seen from such important contributions to understanding how the UNPKF functions at this level as is found in the books by two commanders, Odd Bull and Michael Harbottle. See in particular Odd Bull, På post i Midt-Østen, Oslo, (Gyldendal), 1973, (forthcoming in English).

10. This theme is developed to some extent by Arthur Waskow; and by Egge, Harbottle and Rikbye. Also see the article referred to in footnote 3 above.

11. We are well aware that this may sound like a chauvinist plea, but it is probably a fair judgement. At least the senior author has no record of expression of positive sentiment for the Norwegian military establishment.